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ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER MUST BE REVERSED 
The applicant was injured jumping from a four-foot roof. 
There is no normal, everyday activity that comes even close. 
Jumping off a roof is clearly an unusual exertion, and the 
applicant's injury therefore was legally caused (as well as 
medically caused) by his employment with Sheet Metal Systems. 
Consequently, Sheet Metal Systems is liable to pay for the 
disability, impairment, and medical expenses resulting from the 
applicant's December 1993 injury. 
The Commission, of course, did not conclude that a four-
foot jump is a normal exertion. Instead, it determined that 
the applicant "effectively" jumped only eighteen inches, 
because the applicant testified that he squatted down and put 
one or two hands on the roof before he jumped. ALJ Finding 7, 
R. 568; Commission Order, R. 624. However, the fact that the 
applicant squatted down before he jumped, and the fact that he 
used his hands to balance himself before jumping, do not 
support the determination that the jump from the roof was the 
equivalent of an eighteen-inch drop. In addition, the 
Commission's description of the applicant's "us[ing] his hands 
and arms to lower his body to the grounds" is contradicted by 
the undisputed evidence in the record. Commission Order, R. 
624. Therefore, the Commission's order must be reversed. 
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A. The finding that the applicant "effectively" jumped 
only eighteen inches is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
As established in our opening brief, Utah Tile is entitled 
to judicial relief because it has been prejudiced by agency 
action that is "based upon a determination of fact . . . that 
is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(g) (1997). The "substantial evidence" standard under 
UAPA is less deferential than the "clearly erroneous" standard 
used in reviewing factual findings made by a trial court. 
Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 n.7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). In reviewing an agency's factual findings, the 
appellate court reviews the "whole record," looking not only at 
the evidence that supports the agency's findings, but also at 
the evidence that contradicts those findings. Id. ; Grace Dril-
ling Co. v. Bd. of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). And even though the agency is entitled to a measure of 
latitude, a reviewing court "will not sustain a decision which 
ignores uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence to the 
contrary." Harken v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Min., 920 P.2d 1176, 
1180 (Utah 1996). Under these standards, the Commission's 
finding regarding the effective height of the jump cannot 
stand. 
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1. There is no evidence in the record to support 
the finding that the applicant jumped only 
eighteen inches. 
First, there is no evidence that actually supports the 
Commission's finding. The only evidence that Sheet Metal 
Systems relies on is the testimony given by the applicant while 
Mr. Thomas Sturdy, Sheet Metal Systems' attorney, climbed onto 
a desk and supposedly gave a "demonstration." The key portion 
of this testimony, at least as presented by Sheet Metal 
Systems, came when Mr. Sturdy said, "You squatted down on your 
hands and then jumped like this; is that right?" And the 
applicant responded, "Exactly." Transcript of Hearing, R. 
316:16-18. But this exchange does not support a finding that 
the applicant's jump from the four-foot roof was really only an 
eighteen-inch drop.1 
The only way the four-foot jump could be the equivalent of 
an eighteen-inch drop is if the applicant used his arms to 
bring his body to a complete stop with his feet eighteen inches 
above the ground. Therefore, the only way the exchange between 
Mr. Sturdy and the applicant could support the Commission's 
determination is if Mr. Sturdy were actually suspending himself 
off the ground during the so-called demonstration. Similarly, 
the only way the applicant's testimony could support the find-
xSheet Metal Systems appears to be arguing that the 
demonstration itself is evidence. But, of course, this cannot 
be. Questions asked by an attorney are not evidence, and 
neither would the attorney's actions while asking those 
questions. Also, on a more basic level, there is no evidence 
that Mr. Sturdy personally witnessed the applicant's jump, so 
it would be impossible for him to provide "evidence" of how it 
occurred. 
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ing that he used his arms to lower himself to the ground would 
be if Mr. Sturdy used his arms to lower himself during this 
demonstration. But neither of these things happened. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Sturdy 
was either suspending himself off the ground or using his arms 
to lower himself. Mr. Sturdy did describe "squatting down" and 
"jumping," but he did not say anything about "supporting your-
self with your arms" or "using your arms to lower yourself." 
Second, given that desks are not four feet high, it would be 
highly difficult for Mr. Sturdy to use a desk to suspend him-
self above the ground. Third, the exchange between Mr. Sturdy 
and the applicant lasted quite a while, and it is doubtful that 
Mr. Sturdy would have been holding himself up by his arms for 
that entire time. And finally, when Mr. Sturdy was done with 
his demonstration, he was still on the desk. Otherwise, there 
would not have been any need for Mr. Sturdy and Judge Sims to 
discuss using the airborne landing maneuver to get down, and 
there would be no need for Mr. Sturdy to remark, "I would hurt 
myself if I did that anymore." Transcript, R. 317:13-16. 
Similarly, the applicant's agreement with Mr. Sturdy's 
statement that his legs "pretty much covered the distance" also 
fails to support the Commission's finding that the applicant 
made only an eighteen-inch jump. Transcript, R. 317:3-11. 
Once again, the fact that the applicant's legs covered most of 
the distance is relevant only if the applicant was at a 
complete stop at that point. To use an extreme example, if 
someone were to jump feet-first off a hundred-foot cliff, there 
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would be a point where that person's feet were only eighteen 
inches above the ground, and at that point his or her legs 
would "pretty much cover the distance." But, of course, that 
does not mean that jumping off such a cliff is "effectively" an 
eighteen-inch jump. So, the fact that the applicant's legs 
covered the distance when he was eighteen inches off the ground 
does not support a finding that the applicant jumped only 
eighteen inches. 
2. The undisputed evidence in the record 
contradicts the Commission's finding. 
Ultimately, however, there is no need to determine exactly 
what Mr. Sturdy was doing during this demonstration, because 
even if it were possible to interpret the applicant's testimony 
in the way that Sheet Metal Systems suggests, that would still 
not be enough to support the Commission's finding. As dis-
cussed above, the "substantial evidence" test requires that the 
court consider the whole record, not just the evidence support-
ing the conclusion. And the presence of one ambiguous item, 
even if it could arguably be read to support a finding, is not 
sufficient to withstand appellate review, particularly when 
that one unclear passage is contradicted by several other 
undisputed items in the record, which belie the finding that 
the applicant used his arms to lower himself to the ground. 
For example, three days after the incident, the applicant 
reported a "fall from approximately 4 [feet]." Notes of Dr. 
Schlegel, R. 371. Moreover, at the hearing, the applicant 
testified that he "jumped" about four feet. Transcript, R. 
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315:21. And three other times during the testimony, the 
applicant described his actions as a "hop." Transcript, R. 
277:17-20, 280:12-13, 316:2-3. In fact, at one point, the 
applicant even explained, "I bent down at the knees and put one 
hand on the roof and hopped up," which indicates that the 
"effective height" of the jump was actually greater than four 
feet.2 Transcript, R. 316:2-3 (emphasis added). The appli-
cant's repeated and consistent descriptions of a "hop," "fall," 
and a "jump" are completely incompatible with the slow, deli-
berate process described in the ALJ's findings and in the 
Commission's subsequent order.3 
All in all, the record contains six descriptions of the 
applicant's jump from the roof. Five of these descriptions 
directly contradict the Commission's finding, and one of them, 
at best, could go either way. The finding that the applicant 
actually jumped only eighteen inches thus is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
2This description of the jump must be considered to be more 
reliable than the passage relied on by Sheet Metal Systems. 
This description was unprompted and came directly from the 
applicant himself. The passage relied on by Sheet Metal 
Systems, however, consisted simply of the applicant's agreement 
with statements made by Mr. Sturdy. 
3Also, as noted in the previous brief, the applicant was 
required to use the "parachute landing fall" when he landed. 
ALJ Finding 8, R. 568. Once again, this demonstrates that the 
event was nothing like "stepping off a platform or footstool, 
or sliding from the bed of a pickup truck to the pavement." 
Commission Order, R. 625. 
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B. The Commission erred in concluding that the 
applicant's injury did not "arise out of" his 
employment with Sheet Metal Systems. 
Sheet Metal Systems argues that the Commission is entitled 
to discretion in applying the "unusual exertion" standard. But 
no matter how much discretion (or "pasture") the Commission is 
allowed, it is not free to enter findings of fact that are not 
supported by the evidence, and, as set forth in UAPA, it is not 
allowed to take action based on unsupported factual determina-
tions. The simple, undisputed fact is that the applicant 
jumped off a four-foot roof, and this is not something people 
do every day. 
When the finding regarding the eighteen-inch jump is 
properly rejected, it becomes clear that the applicant's dis-
ability and need for medical treatment were legally caused by 
his employment with Sheet Metal Systems, as required by Allen 
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In fact, 
neither the Commission nor Sheet Metal Systems even attempted 
to argue that a four-foot jump is a normal, everyday event. 
Medical causation is also established by the Commission's 
findings, as, once again, Sheet Metal Systems did not even 
attempt to argue to the contrary. Both prongs of the Allen 
test are thus satisfied, and Sheet Metal Systems is therefore 
liable for the applicant's temporary total disability, as well 
as for its proportionate share of the medical expenses and 
permanent partial impairment compensation. 
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The "unusual exertion" test is simply a way to determine 
whether an injury "arose out of" someone's employment. The 
purpose of this test, as explained in Allen, is to distinguish 
between those injuries that just coincidentally happen to show 
up while the employee is at work and those injuries that are 
connected to the work itself. Id. at 25. And in our case, it 
is clear that the applicant's December 7, 1993, injury was 
brought on by a specific risk of his employment. The applicant 
was not stepping off a curb (or a footstool) when he was 
injured. Instead, he was jumping off a roof. Simply put, the 
applicant was a roofer, his job required him to work on roofs, 
and it was because he jumped off a roof that he was injured. 
In the previous year and a half, he had missed only a few days 
of work because of back pain; but after jumping off the roof, 
he experienced "excruciating" pain and was rendered totally 
disabled for several months. ALJ Findings 1-5, R. 567-68; 
Transcript, R. 277:19-20; ALJ Finding 12, R. 569. The appli-
cant's December injury clearly arose out of his employment with 
Sheet Metal Systems, and Sheet Metal Systems must therefore pay 
his compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners Utah Tile and Roofing and CNA Insurance 
Company therefore reiterate their request that this court 
vacate the Industrial Commission's order of May 1, 1997, and 
remand the matter to the Labor Commission with directions to 
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enter an order requiring Respondent Sheet Metal Systems to pay 
(1) all temporary total disability arising from the December 7, 
1993, accident; (2) one-third of the medical expenses resulting 
from the December 1993 accident; and (3) one-third of the app-
licant's permanent partial impairment compensation. Petition-
ers further request that Sheet Metal Systems be required to 
reimburse Petitioners for any amounts already paid in excess of 
its obligation. 
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